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l. van meensel *
Introduction
At the present time, when a rigorous budgetary policy 
is being imposed in most countries, there are those who 
argue that a rise in taxes, or even new levies on wealth 
and the income from wealth of private individuals, could 
make a contribution to the budgetary effort. Moreover, 
it is widely acknowledged that levies on employment are 
very high in Belgium. It therefore seems useful to fi  nd 
out whether part of the budgetary revenues could come 
from other sources of fi  nance. At issue in particular are 
additional taxes on consumption or activities that cause 
pollution, but also supplementary revenues drawn from 
taxes affecting the assets of private individuals.
This article attempts to position Belgium’s existing levies 
on income from wealth and wealth itself in relation to 
those applying in the other countries of the EU. Whilst 
not claiming to be exhaustive in any way, it is intended to 
present the main characteristics and trends.
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, it takes a brief 
look at some statistical and methodological aspects of 
levies on wealth and the income from wealth. Then, the 
situation in Belgium is analysed. This analysis is followed 
by an international comparison, within the bounds of 
what is possible, of the scope and level of the various 
levies linked to the assets of private individuals. Lastly, 
a concise commentary is provided on advances with 
respect to cooperation on tax matters at the interna-
tional level as well as on the European Directive on taxa-
tion of savings.
1.  Preliminary observations : statistical 
and methodological aspects
It should be emphasised fi  rstly that levies on wealth cover 
a far more extensive spectrum than the (annual) tax on 
net assets in the strict sense, which consists of a rate of 
taxation applied to the value of the wealth. Besides, this 
type of levy does not exist in Belgium. On the other hand, 
Belgium does have a system of taxation on transfers of 
assets and on the returns paid which forms an integral 
part of what is understood by the taxation of wealth.
It is a diffi   cult task to carry out an international com-
parison of the scope of levies on capital and the income 
from capital held by private individuals, and to draw up 
reliable statistics in this respect is no easy matter. In fact, 
statisticians come up against a series of methodological 
problems. The international comparison carried out for 
the purposes of this article is based in essence on an 
annual study by the EC which has resolved several of 
these problems  (1).
Alongside levies on wealth and the income from wealth, 
the system of personal taxation plays a major role in a 
number of countries. A withholding tax on income from 
movable property like the précompte mobilier in Belgium 
does not exist in some of them or, if it does exist, it does 
not provide full discharge, so that income from wealth 
is taxed in the context of personal taxation, at a specifi  c 
rate or not. The taxation of property holdings is also very 
*   The authors wish to thank Hugues Famerée for its contributions to this article.
(1)  EC (2010), Taxation trends in the European Union, data for the EU Member 
States, Iceland and Norway.74
heterogeneous and sometimes included in the personal 
taxation. In addition, tax deductions are granted for 
certain types of savings in several countries. The EC gets 
round the problem posed by these different methods by 
breaking down the taxation of natural persons, on the 
basis of the stock of internal information obtained from 
the national tax authorities, depending on the tax base 
being looked at  : the employed, the self-employed, the 
inactive population and capital flows. Account is therefore 
taken, as far as possible, of the proportion of total tax that 
relates to the income from wealth and the tax deductions 
granted on savings and on interest paid on a mortgage.
The treatment of the income of self-employed workers 
and the relevant levies is also a complex concept. In fact, 
this income remunerates both the labour supplied and 
the capital invested. The same is therefore true of the 
taxes to which the self-employed are subject. However, 
it is a particularly arduous task to undertake an accurate 
breakdown of these two components, with the result that 
the following comparison ignores levies on the income of 
the self-employed.
However, whilst with regard to income from wealth, 
the data from the EC allow the levies payable by private 
individuals to be isolated, they include, with regard to the 
other forms of levies on wealth, those borne wholly or 
partly by companies, which cannot be isolated entirely for 
each country. In the chapter devoted to Belgium below, 
it was nevertheless possible to ignore the taxes paid by 
companies alone, whereas in the international compari-
son which follows, they were still included.
Lastly, it should be emphasised that levies on income from 
wealth are generally made on the gross return whereas it 
may be thought that the latter is partly intended to com-
pensate for the erosion of purchasing power by inflation, 
and consequently to preserve the real value of the wealth. 
The real rates of taxation that take account of levies on the 
real return on assets – and which are therefore higher – 
provide a more reliable picture of the fiscal pressure on 
income from wealth than the nominal rates of levy.
2.  Levies on wealth and income from 
wealth of private individuals in 
Belgium
2.1  Outline of main levies
This section, which is devoted to the levies in Belgium, is 
based on the methodology of the EC in order to differ-
entiate between levies on income from wealth of private 
Table  1  Levies on weaLth and income from weaLth of private individuaLs in BeLgium
(millions of €, unless otherwise stated)
 











Proportion   
(percentages)
 
Federal government   ......................... 55 3,352 3,442 2,342 2,048 20
Registration fees and gift duties  ............ 14 872 1,346 134 76 1
Tax on stock market transactions  ........... 2 133 465 157 129 1
Withholding tax on income from movable 
property (  précompte mobilier  )   .............. 39 2,386 1,737 2,064 2,039 21
Personal taxation (net revenues)  ............ –7 –402 –495 –435 –596 –6
Other  (1)  ................................. 6 363 389 422 400 4
Regional government  ....................... 20 1,208 1,900 4,656 4,982 51
Inheritance tax  ........................... 11 647 1,042 1,485 1,780 18
Gift duties  ............................... 265 270 3
Registration duties  ........................ 7 438 681 2,728 2,744 28
Other  (2)  ................................. 2 123 177 178 188 2
Local government  .......................... 26 1,567 1,875 2,408 2,759 28
of which withholding tax on income from  
immovable property (  précompte immobilier  )   .. 24 1,482 1,773 2,340 2,684 27
  total  .....................................   6,126   7,216   9,405   9,788
p.m. Percentages of GDP  ....................     3.0     2.9     3.1     2.9
Sources : EC, NBB.
(1)  This relates particularly to revenues drawn from tax on long-term savings as well as stamp duty, court office fees, mortgage fees and documentation fees.
(2)  This relates in particular to tax levied by the Brussels-Capital Region on property holdings.
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individuals and other levies on wealth. It does not take 
account of levies on wealth that are paid exclusively by 
companies  (1). With regard to registration fees and some 
other levies, it is impossible to differentiate between the 
portion paid by households and that paid by enterprises 
so that a part – albeit limited – of the revenues referred to 
below originates from companies.
The revenues from the various levies and competence 
in this respect are spread between federal, regional and 
local government. Whilst slightly over half of the revenues 
originating from levies on wealth and on income from 
wealth went in general to the federal government prior 
to 2002, this share represented no more than around a 
fifth in 2009. In fact, half of the revenues arising from 
levies on wealth and income from wealth of private indi-
viduals fell into the purse of the Regions as a result of 
the Lambermont agreements, which involved an almost 
wholesale transfer of registration and gift duties to the 
Regions with effect from 2002.
Part of the registration fees, tax on stock market trans-
actions and documentation fees is still collected at the 
federal level. In Belgium, the levies on income from wealth 
are primarily made up of the withholding tax on income 
from movable property and the net revenues from per-
sonal taxation linked to wealth, made negative by the 
scope of tax deductions. Apart from the Lambermont 
agreements, the decline in revenues drawn from the 
withholding tax on income from movable property has 
also had a negative impact on the portion going to the 
federal government. In nominal terms, revenues going 
to the latter even contracted in 2009 in relation to the 
level shown by them in 1995. This decrease is essentially 
explained by the fall in nominal returns on the assets to 
which the levy applies. The Regions draw the bulk of their 
revenues from registration fees, gift duties and inherit-
ance tax, as well as the withholding tax on income from 
immovable property (précompte immobilier). The reforms 
instituted during the last few years, particularly the reduc-
tion in the rate of levy with respect to gift duties, contrib-
uted to the growth of revenues which also benefited from 
the upward movement in prices on the property market.
As regards local government, the revenues originating 
from levies on wealth correspond more or less to the 
additional percentages levied on the withholding tax on 
income from immovable property. These represent around 
a quarter of the levies on wealth and income from wealth 
of private individuals in Belgium. The cadastral income on 
which the withholding tax on income from immovable 
property is levied is only index-linked and has not been 
reviewed since 1975. As a consequence, local govern-
ment is obliged to raise the rates of levy in order for its 
revenues to develop in line with real economic growth.
2.2  Development of levies on wealth and income 
from wealth of private individuals in Belgium
The revenues drawn from levies on wealth and income 
from wealth of private individuals in Belgium have fluc-
tuated around 3  % of GDP during the last fifteen years. 
This movement is explained by the increase in receipts 
with regard to levies on wealth, on the one hand, and by 
the contraction in revenues resulting from levies on the 
income from wealth, particularly the withholding tax on 
income from movable property, on the other. Expressed 
as a percentage of GDP, these revenues were reduced by 
half between 1995 and 2009, in particular due to the fall 
in the interest rates on deposits.
The growth in revenues originating from other levies on 
wealth results from the increase in receipts relating to 
registration fees and inheritance tax. Revenues from regis-
tration fees increased from 0.6 to 1 % of GDP in 2007 but 
this net increase does not stem from a raising of the rate 
of levy. On the contrary, most of the reforms have been in 
the direction of a reduction in the rates or an expansion 
chArt 1  Development oF levies on wealth 
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Sources : EC, NBB. (1)  These involve in particular part of the withholding tax on property and the 
circulation tax paid by companies, as well as the supplementary distribution tax 
imposed on nuclear power operators in 2009.76
of tax deductions. The favourable developments on the 
property market combined, probably, with a decline in the 
proportion of non-registered payments pulled revenues 
upwards. Since then, the financial and economic crisis 
has brought with it a fall in the number of transactions 
and in prices, leading to a decline in the revenues from 
registration fees, to 0.8 % of GDP in 2009. As for inherit-
ance taxes, these grew from 0.3 to 0.5 % of GDP between 
1995 and 2009, without any increase in the rate of levy.
2.3  Policy with respect to levies on wealth
Alongside levies on the different assets, various tax 
deductions are granted by the federal government in the 
context of the system of personal taxation with the aim of 
influencing the savings behaviour of taxpayers. Essentially, 
it is thus the possession of one’s own home and various 
forms of long-term savings that are encouraged.
The losses in revenues stemming from these tax deduc-
tions form the subject of an estimate in the Inventory 
of fiscal expenditure (Inventaire des dépenses fiscales) 
published by FPS Finance in the parliamentary documents. 
With regard to the tax year 2007, the fiscal expenditure 
relating to property holdings amounted to € 1,441 mil-
lion  (1). Of this, the tax deductions linked to the system 
of mortgage borrowings entered into prior to 2005 
represent the most significant amounts, particularly the 
additional reduction for home buyers’ tax savings. This 
reduction, which is applied at the marginal rate, applies 
to part of the capital depreciation and life insurance linked 
to mortgage borrowings entered into prior to 2005 with 
the aim of acquiring a house to live in. If the latter were 
entered into with the aim of financing a new construc-
tion, the interest payments exceeding the taxable property 
income can give rise to a supplementary deduction.
The capital depreciation and the life insurance that is not 
taken into account for home buyers’ tax savings can be 
deducted, in the context of long-term savings, up to an 
amount of € 2,080 (tax year 2011), at the special average 
taxation rate  (2).
The deduction for a sole and own home was introduced 
with effect from the tax year 2006. This new deduction 
covers the interest, the capital depreciation and the insur-
ance premiums for the mortgage protection life insurance 
on home loans entered into with effect from 2005, at 
a level of € 2,080 plus € 690 for the first ten years. The 
deduction for a sole and own home will gain steadily in 
importance. The decrease, between the tax years 2005 
and 2007, in losses in revenues stemming from the 
(1)  It is not possible to isolate the losses in revenues stemming from life insurance 
policies taken out with a mortgage loan.
(2)  This lies between 30 % and 40 %.
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deduction for home buyers’ tax savings and the com-
plementary deduction of the interest on borrowings has 
been more than offset by the growth in fiscal expenditure 
linked to the deduction for a sole and own home.
Apart from the long-term savings referred to above, it is 
possible to deduct the expenditure allowed for the pur-
chase of shares in the company and for individual pension 
savings (third pillar) at a level of € 870 (tax year 2011) at 
the special average taxation rate  (1). Personal contribu-
tions in the context of group insurance or a pension fund 
in the second pillar also provide an entitlement to a tax 
reduction calculated at the special average taxation rate. 
The grant of a tax break upon payment of the premiums 
gives rise to a fiscal levy on the amounts collected when 
the contract matures, whether it involves pension savings 
in the second or the third pillar. The amount deductible 
in the context of individual pension savings was raised 
considerably (by around a quarter) with effect from the 
tax year 2006, a fact which helps to explain the growth 
in revenue losses.
The significance of these various tax deductions in the 
context of personal taxation remained fairly stable as a 
proportion of GDP, at about 0.6 %, between the tax years 
1996 and 2007.
This tax deduction policy, combined with specific levies 
on certain assets and the exemption of certain kinds 
of income, such as the interest on regulated savings   
deposits, but also the non-taxation of capital gains,   
results in the fact that the various forms of savings are 
taxed in a very different way in Belgium. This situation 
can be partly justified by the wish to stimulate or promote 
certain forms of savings. But it may also bring with it an 
adjustment by private individuals of their asset portfolio 
on the basis of strictly fiscal considerations, without this 
behaviour necessarily constituting an optimum.
The impact of the different levies and tax deductions on 
the assets of private individuals is taken into account in 
the real rate of taxation. This rate takes account of levies 
on acquisitions, annual taxes, exit taxes and also the tax 
deductions granted  (2). The taxes are generally collected 
on the gross return from the asset despite the fact that 
the latter is partly intended to offset the negative impact 
of inflation on the real value of wealth. This offsetting 
does not correspond strictly speaking to a supplementary 
income since it is aimed at maintaining purchasing power. 
That is why the calculation of the real rate of taxation 
is applied to the net return after the deduction of infla-
tion. This exercise has been performed for State notes 
and bonds, savings accounts, pension funds, shares and 
property holdings. Especially in view of the fact that it is 
calculated on the net return, this real rate of taxation is 
(1)  However, the two tax deductions cannot be combined.
(2)  The method used in this context is based on Valenduc (1993).
Table  2  Fiscal expenditure relating to property holdings and savings  (1)










Fiscal expenditure relating to property holdings  .............. 892 1,142 1,303 1,441
Additional reduction for home buyers’ tax savings   ......... 576 806 965 883
Complementary deduction of interest on mortgage borrowings 127 106 83 58
Life insurance premiums and capital depreciation  .......... 189 230 255 249
Deduction for sole and own home  ....................... 251
Fiscal expenditure relating to savings  ....................... 251 326 387 473
Acquisition of shares or stakes in the company  ............ 7 5 6 4
Staff contributions for group insurance / pension fund  
(second pillar)  ......................................... 81 94 94 92
Pension savings (third pillar)  ............................. 163 227 286 377
  total  ..................................................   1,143   1,468   1,689   1,914
p.m. As a percentage of GDP  .............................     0.6     0.6     0.5     0.6
Sources : HCF and various editions of the “Inventory of fiscal expenditure”.
(1)  The deduction applied to the cadastral income of the home is not included in the table because, since 2005, the cadastral income of the taxpayer’s own home may  
no longer form part of personal taxation if there are no mortgage borrowings going back to the system prior to 2005. In both systems, the cadastral income relating to  
the taxpayer’s own home is only taxed to a small extent or not at all.
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very volatile for certain assets  (1), particularly for short-term 
savings products. In order to take account of this aspect 
as far as possible, it is the real average rate of taxation for 
the period 2004-2009 which has been used.
The comparison of levies on the different assets shows 
that as the investment horizon is reduced, the real rate of 
taxation increases. With regard to the period 2004-2009, 
the average real rate of taxation on a term account with a 
duration of less than a year stood at close to 75 %, whilst 
it reached no more than 36  % for term accounts with a 
duration of more than two years. This is simply due to the 
fact that the return on an investment is generally higher 
where its duration is longer.
The rate of levy diverges even more between the differ-
ent types of asset. Thus, the negative rate of taxation 
shows that pension savings are heavily subsidised, both 
for the deductions made at the minimum rate of 30  % 
and at the maximum rate of 40  % Despite specific levies 
on payments  (2), life insurance also benefits from very 
favourable tax treatment. Based on the average return 
on Belgian shares between 2004 and 2009, calculated to 
take account of dividend distributions and capital gains, 
the effective rate of taxation on these assets was 17.6 %, 
that is to say less than the withholding tax on income 
from movable property at 25  %  (3). This situation is attrib-
utable to the fact that capital gains realised during this 
period were not taxed. The zero rate on regulated savings 
deposits also distorts the neutrality of taxation in relation 
to the various forms of savings. The OECD and the fiscal 
and parafiscal section of the High Council of Finance have 
drawn attention in the past to the fact that the lack of 
competition in the area of savings deposits means that 
this tax exemption mainly benefits the banking sector. In 
effect, the banks reward savings deposits at a lower level.
Holdings in undertakings for collective investment 
(referred to as “OPCs” in Belgium) constitute another 
financial product for which the tax incentive plays a 
significant role in the savings behaviour of households. 
In 1990, variable-capital and fixed-capital investment 
companies, ”SICAVs” and ”SICAFs” respectively, were 
created in response to the SICAV in Luxembourg. Up to 
chArt 3  actual rate oF levy on DiFFerent assets oF private inDiviDuals
(percentages)
–100 –50 0 50 100
Regulated savings deposit
1-year State notes and bonds (4)
3-year State notes and bonds (4)
Term account < 1 year (4)
Term account > 2 years (4)
Shares (3)
Pension savings (30% deduction) (2)
Pension savings (40% deduction) (2)
20-year life insurance (30% deduction) (2)
Own home (1)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Based on the purchase of a home at € 200,000 subject to registration fees of 10 %, and financed by mortgage borrowings conferring the right to the deduction for a sole and 
own home.
(2)  Based on an assumed annual return of 6 % and inflation of 2 %, as well as a term of 20 years, taking account of annual levies, exit taxes and any tax deductions.
(3)  Based on the dividend yield and the capital gain in the Belgian All Shares index between 2004 and 2009 ; the dividends distributed are assumed to be taxed at 25 %. 
Furthermore, a tax on stock market transactions of 0.17 % is taken into account.
(4)  For the period 2004-2009.
(1)  With regard to products of this type, the gross return is less than inflation in 
some periods, which entails negative returns in real terms.
(2)  This involves the tax of 1.1 % on payments made into insurance products and the 
annual tax on beneficial holdings.
(3)  The dividends distributed represent around 44 % of the annual return of 5.7 % 
over this period.79
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a few years ago, the incomes issued from capitalisation 
SICAVs were regarded in all cases as capital gains and 
were therefore not subject to the withholding tax on 
income from movable property.
Since 1 January 2006, new rules have applied to capi-
talisation SICAVs that have invested at least 40 % of their 
assets in bonds and benefit from the “European pass-
port”  (1). Thus, since that date, the capital gain obtained 
upon buy-back of the units – and therefore upon their 
sale by the private individual – or the complete or partial 
sharing-out of the assets of the SICAV is subject to the 
withholding tax on income from movable property at 
15 % with regard to the part corresponding to the interest 
collected by the SICAV. Since 1 January 2008, the with-
holding tax on income from movable property also applies 
to the capital gain generated by the bond portfolio, after 
the deduction of losses.
During the last two decades, the significance of holdings 
in OPCs has grown considerably within the wealth of 
private individuals, owing to the favourable tax treatment 
of these financial products. The success of the regulated 
savings deposits is also partly explained by the exemption 
of this product from the withholding tax on income from 
movable property. In the last few years, a net rise in techni-
cal reserves in insurance has also been seen. These include 
the reserves formed in the context of group insurance 
(pension in the second pillar), savings insurance (pension 
savings in the third pillar) and individual life insurance, all 
three of which benefit from favourable tax treatment.
3.  Positioning of Belgium in relation to 
other countries
3.1  General outline
In Belgium, levies on income from wealth of private 
individuals and other levies on wealth increased from 
3.9  % of GDP in 1995 to a maximum of 4.3  % in 2008. 
This share fell back to 4.1  % in 2009 in the wake of the 
financial and economic crisis. As a percentage of GDP, the 
scope of these levies is thus slightly higher in Belgium than 
in the EU on average, where these revenues grew from 
3.2  % in 1995 to 3.8  % in 2008. In order to avoid influ-
encing the international comparability of the data, levies 
on wealth paid by companies are taken into account, 
whereas they were excluded from the analysis of levies in 
Belgium in the previous chapter.
Levies on wealth and income from wealth of private indi-
viduals represent a little under 10 % of total tax revenues 
both in Belgium and in the EU. The development of rev-
enues in the EU is similar to that seen in Belgium.
The comparison between the EU Member States of rev-
enues originating from levies on wealth and the income 
from wealth of private individuals as a percentage of GDP 
shows the significance of these levies in Belgium in 2008 
compared to the European average, with only the United 
Kingdom, France and Cyprus being ahead of Belgium. In 
several countries that have joined the EU during the last 
ten years, the scope of these levies is less than 1  % of 
GDP. The significance of levies on income from wealth is 
less than that of other levies on wealth  (2) in almost all the 
economies. This is very clearly the case in Belgium  : levies 
on income from wealth of private individuals only account 
for 0.6  % of GDP, as against 1  % of GDP in the EU. In 




































































(1)  The item “Other” includes commercial credit and various claims against the public 
authorities and the financial institutions, as well as the currency in circulation held 
by private individuals.
(1)  These funds come under the European Directive on investment funds and can 
therefore be distributed more easily in the EU.
(2)  In the Netherlands, the net effect of levies on income from wealth is actually 
negative owing to the considerable impact of the tax deduction on mortgage 
loans and the deduction of social security contributions in the second pension 
pillar, which result in significant tax refunds.80
Belgium, these revenues originate essentially from the 
withholding tax on income from movable property paid 
by private individuals. This is reduced by the net tax on 
capital within the system of personal taxation, this being 
negative following the significant tax deductions in the 
context of personal taxation.



































































































In percent of GDP As a proportion of total revenues
Source : EC.






















































































































LEVIES ON WEALTH OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
IN THE EU MEMBER STATES
(in percent of GDP, 2008)
Levies on income from wealth of private individuals
Other levies on wealth
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSETS AND LEVIES ON ASSETS
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The level of taxes on wealth and the income from wealth 
as a percentage of GDP does not constitute a relevant 
piece of information with regard to the scope of rates of 
levy for a given country. In fact, it is strongly dependent 
on the size of the wealth of private individuals in this 
country, an approximation of which can be given by their 
gross financial assets as a percentage of GDP, therefore 
excluding the value of property holdings. In general, 
those countries where private individuals have a relatively 
large amount of wealth as a percentage of GDP show 
higher revenues originating from levies on wealth and the 
income from wealth as a percentage of GDP.
Nevertheless, the relationship between assets and the 
levies on assets, as a percentage of GDP, shows that 
countries posting a similar level of wealth may display 
levies on wealth that differ considerably. Thus, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, both of which have a high 
level of gross financial assets as a percentage of GDP, post 
very different levels of revenues levied on wealth and the 
income from wealth. These reached 7.6  % of GDP in the 
United Kingdom in 2008, whilst they were only 1.2  % of 
GDP in the Netherlands. Compared to countries where 
private individuals hold financial wealth of a comparable 
scope in relation to GDP such as Italy, Portugal, Denmark 
and the Netherlands, Belgium applies relatively sizeable 
levies on assets and the corresponding income. In the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, fiscal pressure on 
the wealth of private individuals is around twice as great 
as in Belgium.
In view of the effect of the tax base, it is necessary to com-
plete the analysis with the main rates of levy for the main 
taxes on property and financial assets. The analysis pre-
sented below can only be regarded as an indication of the 
way in which wealth and the income from wealth are taxed 
in Belgium. In fact, it is not possible to be exhaustive owing 
to the complexity of the different systems which generally 
include numerous exceptions to the standard rates.
3.2  Taxation of property holdings
Property holdings are a key component of households’ 
assets. A study carried out on Belgium by the OECD in 
July 2009 included an analysis of the size of levies on 
property holdings  (1). The data from 2007 reveal that the 
scope of annual levies on property holdings (this involves 
the withholding tax on income from immovable property, 
which is reduced by the tax deductions in the context of 
personal taxation) was, at 0.4 % of GDP, lower in Belgium 
than the average of the EU15, where revenues amounted 
to 0.8 % of GDP, and much lower than that recorded in the 
United Kingdom and France. Amongst the countries for 
which information was available, only Hungary, Austria, 
the Czech Republic and Greece had lower revenues as a 
percentage of GDP. The OECD underlined the fact that 
the relatively weak fiscal pressure on property holdings 
in Belgium results from the tax treatment of mortgage 
loans and the withholding tax on income from immovable 
property. The system of mortgage deductions is based on 
the marginal rate of taxation and is wider than in most of 
the other countries, given that it relates not only to the 
interest payments but also to the capital repayments and 
the premiums for the mortgage protection life insurance.
The converse is found if levies on transactions relating to 
the purchase of housing are considered. A study carried 
out by the European Mortgage Federation in 2010 reveals 
that, in relation to the overall purchase price of a home, 
the levies on the purchase are highest in Belgium out of 
the fourteen countries included in the comparison. These 
significant levies represent, on average, close to 10  % of 
the overall price when a purchasing a home.
In the analysis referred to above, the OECD indicated that 
tax deductions ultimately lead to higher housing prices 
and are harmful, along with significant transaction costs, 
to mobility on the labour market and the allocation of 
the workforce. Furthermore, the institution highlighted 
the fact that, according to its empirical studies, levies on 
property holdings weigh less heavily on economic growth 
than other taxes, so that this tax base can be utilised to 
a greater extent than is currently the case. It therefore 
advocated increasing the annual levies on housing on the 
basis of a realistic cadastral income and limiting the tax 
deduction to interest payments.
3.3  Taxation of financial assets
In Belgium, the withholding tax on income from movable 
property applicable to interest and dividends is the main 
levy on income from financial assets. This provides full 
discharge if the taxpayer wishes. This income need not 
be listed in the declaration relating to personal taxation, 
therefore. In several countries, there is no system of with-
holding tax on income from movable property or if there 
is, it does not always provide full discharge.
The comparison of the tax treatment of dividends is based 
of the data from the OECD. These data take account 
of the fact that there is no withholding tax on income 
from movable property providing full discharge in several 
countries and that the income from dividends is either 
(1)  The OECD does not distinguish in this regard between levies paid by private 
individuals and those paid by companies.82
taxed or not at a particular rate in the system of personal 
taxation  (1). The data take account of the highest marginal 
rate at which this income can be taxed. It appears that 
the highest rate of withholding tax on income from mov-
able property applicable to dividends in Belgium, which is 
25  %, is positioned at the average of that applied in the 
other countries, whilst the rate of 15  % on the dividends 
of certain shares is below the average  (2). Around one-third 
of the dividends distributed in Belgium between 2004 
and 2006 were taxed at a rate of 15 %.
When levies on interest from government bonds are con-
sidered, it appears that the withholding tax on income 
from movable property providing full discharge at 15 % in 
Belgium is also lower than the average of the other coun-
tries. Only Luxembourg, Greece and Italy apply a lower 
rate for residents. In the United Kingdom and Denmark, 
this income is taxed at the marginal rate for personal taxa-
tion, the rates of taxation thus potentially amounting to 
more than 50 %.
A general levy on capital gains is lacking in Belgium where 
they are not normally taxed, with notably the exception 
of carry transactions for property holdings and, as already 
indicated, capitalisation SICAVs that invest more than 
40 % in bonds.
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Lithuania, the Czech 
Republic and Cyprus do not tax capital gains on shares  (3) 
either. Other countries such as Austria and Portugal have 
systems that only tax the capital gains on shares if they are 
made within a particular timeframe. In most of the other 
countries, the rate of taxation on capital gains approaches 
the withholding tax on income from movable property 
levied on dividends. This makes the tax system more neu-
tral in respect of the type of growth in wealth.
3.4  Inheritance taxes and gift duties
A comparison of revenues from taxes on inheritance and 
gifts as a percentage of GDP reveals that Belgium records 
the most significant revenues, based on the data from 
the OECD. This stems partly from the relatively high level 
of wealth in Belgium, but also from relatively high rates. 
However, comparing the systems is a very complicated 
matter owing to the differing taxation depending on the 
degree of blood relationship, which constitutes a key 
factor in determining the rate in a large number of coun-
tries. But if the highest marginal rate for inheritance taxes 
in the direct line is considered – that is to say to children, 
between spouses or, in certain circumstances, between 
cohabitees – it can be seen that the rate is relatively 































































































RECURRING (ANNUAL) LEVIES ON PROPERTY ASSETS
(in percent of GDP, 2007)






Sources : OECD, European Mortgage Federation.
(1)  No account was taken of company tax on distributed profits since it was consid-
ered that this tax is only borne to a very small extent by the saver in a world of 
capital mobility and that it mainly results in a fall in investment.
(2)  The rate of 15 % applies to the dividends on shares issued from 1994 onwards, 
the dividends of SMEs listed on a stock exchange and the dividends distributed by 
investment companies.
(3)  It is impossible to compare the levies on capital gains on property holdings owing 
to the complexity of the systems in force in the different countries.83
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significant in the Belgian Regions. The rate is only higher 
in France, the United Kingdom and Spain. In the United 
Kingdom, however, where the highest marginal rate is 
40 %, the first portion of the estate is exempt from tax and 
the amount of this exempt portion is relatively significant, 
at £  312,000. In many countries, and more particularly 
in the countries that have joined the EU recently, there 
is no system of inheritance taxes. Other countries, such 
as Portugal and Austria, have abolished their systems 
of inheritance taxes in the more recent past – in 2004 
and 2008 respectively.
3.5  Levies on wealth in the strict sense
Levies on wealth are generally understood in the first 
instance to mean an annual levy on the net wealth of pri-
vate individuals. This type of levy no longer exists except 
in a small number of European countries. Only France, 
Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein still apply this type 
of taxation. In the Netherlands, the levy on wealth was 
replaced in 2001 by a levy on a notional return, which 
corresponds de facto to a levy on wealth.
In other European countries, these levies have been abol-
ished during the last few decades. Thus, levies on wealth 
have disappeared in Austria (1994), Denmark (1997), 
Germany (1997), Finland (2006), Luxembourg (2006), 
Sweden (2007) and Spain (2008). These reforms were 
frequently accompanied by an increase in other taxes on 
income (from capital).
Owing to the need to undertake budgetary consolidation, 
however, several countries are looking at reintroducing 
levies on wealth. This is the case in Spain and Ireland, for 
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(1)  With regard to Belgium, the rate of 25 % and the reduced rate of 15 % are both listed.
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example. An outline of the levies on wealth applied in 
France and the Netherlands can be found below.
France
France has a long tradition of levies on wealth. In 1982, 
a tax on high levels of wealth (impôt sur les grandes for-
tunes) was introduced which was abolished in 1987 and 
subsequently replaced by a solidarity tax on wealth, the 
impôt de solidarité sur la fortune, abbreviated ISF. The 
latter is an annual levy, involving progressive rates, on 
the wealth of private individuals with the aim of increas-
ing redistribution by way of the tax system. This levy is 
payable from the point where the net value of wealth is 
greater than € 790,000 (as at 1 January 2009)  (1). The rate 
of levy increases from 0.55  % on the first slice to 1.8  % 
on net wealth of more than €  16,480,000. There are 
several restrictions in place to prevent income being taxed 
“excessively”. In 2005, a so-called “tax shield” (bouclier 
fiscal) was introduced, by virtue of which the combined 
total of direct taxes on income, including the ISF, could 
not exceed 60 % of the aforementioned income. In 2008, 
this restriction was scaled back to 50 %.
The fairly small product of the levy has fluctuated 
between 0.15 % and 0.2 % of GDP in the last few years. 
The costs associated with its collection and its control 
are expected to remain limited, varying between 2 and 
2.5  % of the product. According to an evaluation by the 
French national audit office (Cour des comptes française), 
the “ISF is increasingly developing in the direction of 
property taxation”. Moreover, an outflow of capital has 
been observed, although its exact impact is difficult to 
calculate.
the netherlanDs
In 2001, the levy on wealth in force in the Netherlands, at 
a rate of 0.7 %, and also the levy on income from wealth, 
were replaced by a levy on the return from wealth, which 
forms part of the system of personal taxation. This levy 
assumes a notional return on wealth of 4  %, on which a 
tax of 30  % is levied. This tax corresponds de facto to an 
annual levy on wealth of 1.2  %  (2). Taking account of the 
way it operates, the levy is fairly stable and fluctuates in 
the region of 0.5 % of GDP.
The levy on notional income could bring about negative 
returns in a few years, after subtracting inflation, for 
those investors who have opted for a portfolio of defen-
sive investments (e.g. savings deposit).
chArt 10  inheritance tax anD giFt Duties
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Sources : OECD, NBB.
(1)  The assets taxed consist in particular of property holdings that are unbuilt, built 
and in the course of construction, State notes and bonds, shares, jewellery, cars 
and horses. The value of the main home is reduced by 30 % Debts relating to 
these assets can be deducted.
(2)  The wealth is taxed with effect from € 20,661 (in 2010) or € 41,322 for married 
persons or registered partners ; this threshold is increased by € 2,762 for each 
dependent child. The wealth includes in particular bank accounts, shares, bonds, 
investments and certain forms of property holdings (e.g. second homes). It is 
reduced by unpaid debts. The taxpayer’s own home and certain financial hold-
ings, and also works of art, are not included.85
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4.  International cooperation
In the last few years, an effort has been made to reduce 
international tax evasion, particularly tax evasion relating 
to income from wealth. In fact, the free circulation of 
capital and the lack of coordination between countries 
provided private individuals with the opportunity to evade 
tax on income from wealth. This section briefly sets out 
the work of the OECD to combat tax evasion, as well as 
outlining the European Directive on taxation of savings.
4.1  Work of the OECD to combat tax havens and 
tax evasion
The OECD has been working to improve international 
cooperation with respect to transparency and the 
exchange of tax information for around fifteen years. In 
concrete terms, this institution advocates exchange of 
information between tax authorities on demand and in 
specific cases in order to provide the tax authorities with 
better tools to act against fraud.
In 1996, at the instigation of the G7, the OECD launched 
a project focusing on harmful tax practices. An initial 
report on the subject was published in 1998  (1). It served 
as the basis for discussions held within the OECD in order 
to eliminate preferential tax regimes, identify tax havens 
and urge them to adopt the standards of the OECD with 
respect to tax cooperation. Non-member countries were 
encouraged to join in with the OECD’s work  (2).
In a report published in 2000  (3), the OECD drew up a list 
of 35 countries and territories fulfilling the criteria of tax 
haven  (4). In the wake of this report, numerous countries 
undertook to observe the principles of the OECD with 
respect to transparency and exchange of tax information.
In April 2009, the members of the G20 put pressure on 
uncooperative countries by raising the threat of sanctions. 
For its part, the OECD drew up three lists in a report 
published on 2 April 2009 to classify countries according 
to their degree of tax cooperation  : a black list, a white 
list and a grey list. The countries on the white list are 
regarded as sufficiently observing the standards ; those on 
the grey list have promised to conform to them although 
they have not done so yet and those on the black list have 
refused to commit to them. In the wake of this report, 
clear improvements were observed in 2009 when the 
OECD’s standards were approved and adopted by numer-
ous countries.
When the report was published, Belgium appeared on 
the grey list. Under international pressure, it then made 
a commitment to quickly implement observance of the 
OECD standards. In various ways since then, it has shown 
its willingness to increase tax transparency  : bringing 
forward its participation in the system for exchanging 
information in the context of the European Directive 
on the taxation of savings (1 January 2010 instead of 
1 July 2011), systematic incorporation of the exchange 
of tax information at every renegotiation of a bilateral 
convention and the signing of numerous agreements 
observing the OECD standards.
In July 2009, Belgium signed the 12th agreement on the 
exchange of information for tax purposes, an act which 
allowed it to move off the grey list (29 countries moved 
from the grey list to the white list in the course of 2009). 
Furthermore, it has established numerous bilateral con-
tacts in order to multiply the number of tax agreements.
4.2  European Savings Taxation Directive
The free circulation of capital and the lack of coordina-
tion between the Member States of the European Union 
regarding taxation of income from savings allowed pri-
vate individuals to evade taxation on interest collected 
in a Member State other than their country of residence. 
This situation generated movements of capital between 
Member States and distortions that worsened the condi-
tions on the internal market. In the context of the fight 
against detrimental fiscal competition, the Member States 
finally decided in 2003 to adopt a Directive in order to 
rectify these distortions.
In concrete terms, the aim of this Directive, which has 
been in effect since 1 July 2005, is to ensure the effective 
taxation of income from savings collected in the form of 
interest payments that are made in one Member State in 
favour of natural persons having their place of residence in 
another Member State, in accordance with the legislative 
provisions of the latter country. In order to do this, it envis-
ages that the Member States undertake the automatic 
exchange of information relating to these payment flows. 
Whilst the exchange of information is the cornerstone of 
the Directive, three countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Austria) have nevertheless obtained a temporary exemp-
tion, allowing them not to exchange this information but 
to levy a deduction at source. These countries raised the 
(1)  OECD (1998).
(2)  The OECD standards with respect to tax cooperation require in particular the 
exchange of tax information on demand, the abolition of banking secrecy, access 
to reliable information, observance of taxpayers’ rights and an assurance of the 
confidentiality of the data exchanged.
(3)  OECD (2000).
(4)  According to the OECD definition, a tax haven is defined on the basis of several 
criteria, particularly the following four : insignificant or non-existent taxes, lack of 
transparency on the tax regime, absence of information exchange and attraction 
of dummy companies with fictitious activities.86
objection that the mechanism for exchanging informa-
tion was contrary to their legislation on banking secrecy. 
During the transition period, the three Member States are 
nevertheless entitled to receive information from other 
Member States and to bring forward the introduction of 
automatic information exchange. When this is done, the 
countries concerned will no longer make a deduction at 
source. Belgium has decided to take part in the system 
for exchanging information under the European Savings 
Taxation Directive with effect from 1 January 2010.
The deduction at source stood at 15  % between 
1 July 2005 and 30 June 2008, and at 20  % between 
1 July 2008 and 30 June 2011. It will be 35 % with effect 
from 1 July 2011. This taxation is rebated at a level of 
75  % in the beneficiary’s country of residence. The State 
levying the deduction at source keeps 25  % of the pro-
ceeds generated in this way to offset the administrative 
costs associated with collecting the tax  (1).
In order to prevent a flight of capital from the EU, the 
Member States have opened negotiations to encour-
age associated and dependent territories and certain 
third-party countries to adopt similar provisions. The 
Directive has been partly or fully adopted by the follow-
ing countries  : Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, 
Monaco, Andorra, Anguilla, Montserrat, the Cayman 
Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, the British Virgin 
Islands, the Turks and Caïcos Islands, the Dutch Antilles 
and Aruba.
Every three years, the EC submits a report to the Council 
of Ministers about the operation and effectiveness of the 
Directive. The first report, drawn up in 2008, reveals that 
amongst the countries having opted for the exchange 
of information, it is the largest economies that show the 
highest figures with respect to declaration of interest col-
lected by non-residents. Thus, the United Kingdom posted 
an amount of € 9.1 billion for payments made between 
1 July 2005 and 5 April 2006 (the end of the tax year). 
Between 2005 and 2007, France declared € 5.1 billion  ; 
Italy 3.1 billion and Germany close to 3 billion. The case 
of Luxembourg, which declared €  11.6 billion of inter-
est collected by non-residents over the period 2005 to 
2007, also deserves to be highlighted. The tax amnesty 
offered in Germany between 31 December 2003 and 
1 April 2005 could explain this high figure.
As for the countries applying a deduction at source, the 
lion’s share of the revenue for 2005, 2006 and 2007 origi-
nates from Switzerland and Luxembourg, at 46  % and 
23  % of total revenues respectively. Austria and Belgium 
account for 8.3 % and 3.9 % of the amounts collected at 
source respectively ; and Jersey and the Isle of Man 6.2 % 
and 4.2  % respectively  (2). The other countries having 
opted for a deduction at source (third-party countries and 
associated territories other than those referred to above) 
only represent a small proportion of the total collected. 
In Belgium, the portion retained from the deductions 
at source levied on interest payments to non-residents 
represented between 5.5 and 11.8 million annually from 
2006 to 2009  (3).
Over the period 2005-2006, the largest beneficiaries of 
the deduction at source were Germany (€ 192.7 million) 
and Italy (112.9 million). Belgium received € 56 million in 
2006, 53 million in 2007, 83 million in 2008 and 49 mil-
lion in 2009. This income originates essentially from 
Luxembourg and Switzerland (on average, 73  % of the 
income received during the period 2006-2009 originates 
from Luxembourg and 24 % from Switzerland).
According to the EC report, the analyses compiled from 
the data gathered over the period 2000-2007 by other 
sources (BIS, Eurostat and the European Fund and Asset 
Management Association) do not show any noticeable 
change in the behaviour of private individuals with respect 
to savings following the implementation of the Directive. 
Whilst certain significant developments are observed, they 
were already in existence prior to the introduction of the 
Directive  (4).
In its report, the EC puts forward changes in order to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the Directive. In fact, sev-
eral weak areas in the text give rise to opportunities to get 
round the legislation. In the first place, the Directive only 
applies in countries that are signatories  ; consequently, it 
runs the risk of generating relocation effects. Secondly, it 
only applies to natural persons ; it is therefore easy to get 
round through recourse to legal persons. Thirdly, the defi-
nition of income from interest makes it possible to circum-
vent the Directive by using innovative financial products.
The first change requested by the EC in order to rectify 
these weaknesses would be to ask the paying agents to 
use all the information at their disposal about the true 
actual beneficiary when payments are made in favour 
of artificial persons or legal entities. This method should 
make it possible to detect cases where a payment made 
(1)  It should be noted that the mechanism of deduction at source is optional for 
the actual beneficiary who can in fact authorise the paying agent to send the 
required information to the tax authorities in his Member State. The actual 
beneficiary must produce a certificate issued by his country of residence to avoid 
the deduction at source on the interest paid to him.
(2)  That is to say € 631 million for Switzerland over the period 2005-2007, 313 mil-
lion for Luxembourg, 113 million for Austria, 84 million for Jersey, 57 million for 
the Isle of Man and 53 million for Belgium. 
(3)  That is to say € 5.5 million in 2006 ; 8.3 million in 2007 ; 10.1 million in 2008 and 
11.8 million in 2009.
(4)  This observation could also result from the fact that the directive was anticipated 
during the period under analysis.87
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in favour of an artificial person is actually intended for a 
natural person.
In order to clarify the concept of paying agent “upon 
receipt”, the EC advocates as a further change the use 
of a positive definition of the intermediate structures 
established within the Member States and required to act 
as paying agents “upon receipt”. These structures would 
thus be forced to apply the provisions of the Directive 
unequivocally.
The third element of the EC recommendations covers 
several aspects. Firstly, the definition of interest payment 
is too restrictive. Consequently, certain innovative finan-
cial products which can be equated with the products 
explicitly covered by the Directive make it possible to get 
round the legislation. The EC proposes widening the defi-
nition of interest payments by taking account of develop-
ments in savings products and the behaviour of investors. 
Secondly, the treatment of securities issued by OPCs is not 
consistent. Depending on their technical characteristics, 
certain OPCs come under the scope of the Directive whilst 
others escape it. In order to remove these differences in 
treatment, it is important to establish a precise definition 
of the entire group of OPCs to be incorporated in the 
Directive’s area of application. The use of a definition that 
is both simple and inclusive would make it possible to 
reduce the risk of getting round it. Furthermore, certain 
Member States wished to widen the area of application of 
the Directive to payments of dividends and capital gains 
originating from investments that do not offer any sub-
stantial protection of capital. This position was not widely 
shared since the Directive is not the ideal framework for 
improving cooperation between tax authorities in this 
respect.
Based on this report, the EC adopted a proposal to modify 
the Directive on 13 November 2008. The European 
Parliament approved the proposal from the EC and put 
forward a series of amendments. The favourable Opinion 
of the European Economic and Social Committee was 
adopted on 13 May 2009. On 25 November 2009, the 
Ecofin Council reached a policy agreement and submit-
ted a proposal for a Directive amending the European 
Directive on taxation of savings. Whilst the text is regarded 
as acceptable overall to the Council, certain countries 
have nevertheless expressed reservations. Discussions are 
currently still in progress.
4.3  Discussions regarding the possible introduction 
of a tax on banks
The possible introduction of a tax on banks is the sub-
ject of a debate on the international stage (G20, EU). 
No consensus has been reached at the present time. 
Certain countries which have been only slightly affected 
by the financial crisis (such as Canada) are opposed to 
it. Nevertheless, at the European level, the unilateral 
introduction of a tax on banks has been decided on 
for the territory of the EU. This decision was taken at 
the meeting of the European Council on 17 June 2010. 
The Member States wish “to introduce systems of levies 
and taxes on financial institutions to ensure fair burden-
sharing and to set incentives to contain systemic risk“. 
The European Council emphasised the importance of 
coordinated and consistent action by Member States in 
order to prevent distortions of competitiveness between 
national markets and problems of multiple taxation for 
cross-border institutions.
The taxation package to be introduced is still causing 
debate. Several lines of action are envisaged  : on the 
one hand, there is taxation of the profits or the activities 
of financial institutions  ; on the other hand, taxation of 
financial transactions. This summer, the European Council 
asked the EC to consider the terms of a tax on banks. On 
7 October 2010, the EC submitted its ideas in this respect, 
proposing a dual approach. At the global level, it sug-
gests introducing a tax on financial transactions. The EU 
hopes to convince its international partners of the merits 
of a global process. At the EU level, however, a tax on 
financial activities would be preferable according to the 
EC. The latter will shortly carry out an impact analysis on 
the aforementioned measures, in order to deliver concrete 
proposals in 2011.
Table  3  DeDuctions at source receiveD










Belgium  ..................... 16 56 53
Austria  ...................... 2 8 10
Germany  .................... 38 155 n.
Spain  ....................... 13 39 46
France  ...................... 13 50 64
Greece  ...................... 5 14 n.
Italy  ........................ 28 85 107
Netherlands   .................. 7 23 27
United Kingdom   .............. 33 62 86
Source : Hemmelgarn T. and G. Nicodème (2009).
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Conclusions
It is no simple matter to compare levies on the wealth 
of private individuals, owing to the complexity of the 
systems and the diversity of the components of wealth. 
Nevertheless, several general findings can be expressed.
Compared to the average in the EU, levies on the wealth 
of private individuals and the income that they draw from 
it in relation to GDP are fairly substantial in Belgium over-
all. This is due in part to the relatively significant volume 
of assets held by private individuals in Belgium, but also 
to the rates of certain levies. The comparison between 
Belgian rates and those applying in other countries does 
not allow a clear-cut conclusion to be drawn. It should 
nevertheless be noted that in Belgium, the annual income 
from wealth is generally taxed moderately and levies on 
capital gains are virtually non-existent. On the other hand, 
wealth-related transactions such as property purchase and 
the inheritance of estates are taxed relatively heavily. The 
actual rate of taxation is distributed very unfairly between 
the different forms of assets. Some are heavily subsidised, 
by way of tax deductions granted in the context of taxa-
tion of natural persons, such as pension savings, whilst 
some financial products, particularly those with short 
terms to maturity, are taxed quite heavily.
At the international level, it is the case that levies on 
wealth in the strict sense have disappeared in most coun-
tries over the last twenty years. They have persisted in a 
number of countries and it is not impossible that the need 
to undertake budgetary consolidation will prompt others 
to reinstate them.
In the last few years, an effort has been made to reduce 
international tax evasion, particularly those relating to 
income from wealth. In fact, the free circulation of capital 
and the lack of coordination between countries provided 
private individuals with the opportunity to evade tax on 
income from wealth. In order to combat tax evasion 
effectively, the OECD has been encouraging transparency 
and the exchange of tax information for about fifteen 
years. In 2009, under international pressure, numerous 
countries (including Belgium) took measures to comply 
with the OECD’s tax standards. At the EU level, the 
Member States adopted a Directive on the taxation of 
income from savings in 2003. Omissions in the current 
text (in effect since 1 July 2005) provide private individu-
als with various opportunities to get round the Directive. 
In 2008, the EC proposed some amendments to the 
Directive in order to rectify these problems. Nevertheless, 
the new legislative text has not yet been adopted by the 
Ecofin Council.89
trEnds in tAxAtion of privAtEly hEld AssEts
Bibliography
Conseil des prélèvements obligatoires (2009), Le patrimoine des ménages, March.
Council of the European Union (2009), Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payements – Policital agreement, Note, Interinstitutional file : 2008/0215 (CNS), 
Brussels, 25 November.
EC (2008a), Refining the present coverage of Council Directive 2003/48/CE on taxation of income from savings 
(“Savings Taxation Directive”), Commission Staff Working Document, SEC/2008/559, Brussels, 29 April.
EC (2008b), Report from the Commission to the Council in accordance with Article 18 of Council Directive 2003/48/EC 
on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payements, SEC/2008//2420, Brussels, 15 September.
EC (2010a), Commission outlines vision for taxing the financial sector, Press release, IP/10/1298, Brussels, 7 October 
(http://europa.eu).
EC (2010b), Commission services non-paper on bank levies for discussion at the EFC meeting on 31 August 2010, 
Internal Market and Services, DG Financial Institutions, Banking and Financial Conglomerates, Commission non-paper, 
Brussels, 20 August.
EC (2010c), Issues note : Financial sector taxation, Commission non-paper, 19 August.
EC (2010d), Taxation of savings income (http://europa.eu).
EC (2010e), Taxation of the financial sector, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM 2010/549, Brussels, 
7 October.
EC (2010f), Taxation trends in the European Union, data for the EU Member States, Iceland and Norway, 2010, 
Publication Office of the European Union.
EU (2003), Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payements, Official Journal of the European Union, 38-48, 26 June.
Eura-Audit International (2007), Les impôts en Europe 2008, 16th edition, Delmas.
European Council (2010), European Council 17 June 2010 : Conclusions, Cover Note, EUCO 13/10, CO EUR 9, 
CONCL 2, Brussels, 17 June.
European Mortgage Federation (2010), The cost of housing in Europe.
Hemmelgarn T. and G. Nicodème (2009), Tax co-ordination in Europe : Assessing the first years of the EU Savings 
Taxation Directive, EC, Taxation Paper, Working Paper 18, Belgium.
High Council of Finance, Fiscal and Parafiscal Department (2007), Belasting op arbeid, werkgelegenheid en 
concurrentievermogen, August.
Høj J. (2009), How to reform the Belgian tax system to enhance economic growth ?, OECD, Economics Department 
Working Paper 741, 18 December.
IMF (2010), A fair and substantial contribution by the financial sector, Final Report for the G20, June.
Kesti J. (ed.) (2009), European Tax Handbook 2009, IBFD, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.90
Lassaux R. (2009), La Belgique, retirée de la liste grise des paradis fiscaux de l’OCDE..., Institut des Experts-comptables 
et des Conseils fiscaux, 21 August (www.iec-iab.be)
OECD (1998), “Harmful tax competition : An emerging global issue” (www.oecd.org).
OECD (2000), “Toward global tax co-operation : Progress in identifying and eliminating harmful tax practices”  
(www.oecd.org).
OECD (2007), OECD Economic surveys Belgium, Volume 2007/3, March.
OECD (2009a), Belgium makes progress implementing OECD standards on tax information exchange, 16 July  
(www.oecd.org).
OECD (2009b), OECD Economic surveys Belgium, Volume 2009/12, July.
OECD (2010a), Fighting tax evasion (www.oecd.org/fiscalite/fraude).
OECD (2010b), Promoting transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, Brief Reference Note, 
3 September.
Pacolet J., I. Van De Putte and C. Coudron (2005), Zonder pardon, spaarfiscaliteit, vermogensbelasting en fiscale 
amnestie, HIVA-KULeuven, March.
Valenduc C. (1993), “L’imposition effective de l’épargne des ménages”, Bulletin de Documentation, Ministère fédéral 
des Finances, March.